

# Felipe Barbieri

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<b>Placement Director</b>	Iouri Manovskii	<a href="mailto:manovski@econ.upenn.edu">manovski@econ.upenn.edu</a>	215-898-6880
<b>Placement Director</b>	Jesús Fernández-Villaverde	<a href="mailto:jesusfv@econ.upenn.edu">jesusfv@econ.upenn.edu</a>	215-898-1504
<b>Graduate Coordinator</b>	Gina Conway	<a href="mailto:gnc@sas.upenn.edu">gnc@sas.upenn.edu</a>	215-898-5691

**EDUCATION**    **University of Pennsylvania**    2019 - present  
*Ph.D. in Economics*

Advisors: Aviv Nevo and Juan Camilo Castillo

Research Fields: Industrial Organization, Urban Economics

**Sciences Po Paris**    2014 - 2016  
*M.Sc. in Economics, Ph.D. track*

**Sciences Po Paris**    2011 - 2014  
*B.A. in Economics and Social Sciences, major in Economics*

**REFERENCES**

<b>Aviv Nevo</b> George A. Weiss & Lydia Bravo Weiss University Professor, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (215)898-0499 <a href="mailto:anevo@wharton.upenn.edu">anevo@wharton.upenn.edu</a>	<b>Juan Camilo Castillo</b> Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (650)422-9875 <a href="mailto:jccast@upenn.edu">jccast@upenn.edu</a>	<b>Gilles Duranton</b> Deans Chair in Real Estate Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (215)898-2859 <a href="mailto:duranton@wharton.upenn.edu">duranton@wharton.upenn.edu</a>
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## WORKING PAPERS

**Market Power and the Welfare Effects of Institutional Landlords**  
**(Job Market Paper)**

*With Gregory Dobbels*

Abstract: In the last decade, large financial institutions in the United States have purchased hundreds of thousands of homes and converted them to rentals. This paper studies the welfare consequences of institutional ownership of single-family housing. We build an equilibrium model of the housing market with two sectors: rental and homeownership. The model captures two key forces from institutional purchases of homes: changes in rental concentration and reallocation of housing stock across sectors. To estimate the model, we construct a novel dataset of individual homes in metropolitan Atlanta, identifying institutional owners of each house and scraping house-level daily prices, rents, vacancies, web page views, and customer contacts from Zillow. We find that institutional acquisitions increase average renter welfare by \$2,760 per year (with rents decreasing by 2.3%). This net benefit reflects two opposing effects: higher concentration raises rents by 3.8%, but higher rental supply lowers rents by 6.1%. On the other hand, the welfare of the average homebuyer decreases by \$49,950. On the supply side, institutional acquisitions benefit house sellers but harm the average landlord.

**Optimal Urban Transportation Policy: Evidence from Chicago**  
**(R&R, Econometrica)**

*With Milena Almagro, Juan Camilo Castillo, Nathaniel Hickok, and Tobias Salz*

Abstract: We characterize and quantify optimal urban transportation policies in the presence of congestion and environmental externalities. We formulate a framework in which a municipal government chooses among transportation equilibria through its choice of public transit policies, prices and frequencies as well as

road pricing. The government faces a budget constraint that introduces monopoly-like distortions and the potential need to cross-subsidize modes. We apply this framework to Chicago, for which we construct a new dataset that comprehensively captures transportation choices. We find that road pricing alone leads to large welfare gains by reducing externalities, but at the expense of travelers, whose surplus falls even if road pricing revenues are fully rebated. The optimal public transit price is near zero, with reduced bus and increased train frequencies. Combining transit policies with road pricing slackens the budget constraint, allowing for higher transit frequencies and lower prices, thereby increasing consumer surplus after rebates.

**WORK IN  
PROGRESS**

**Optimal Rental Assistance and Homelessness in Market Equilibrium**

*With Olivia Diaz Gilbert and Keunsang Song*

**Estimating Labor Market Power using Job Vacancy Duration Data: Evidence from France**

*With Thomas Le Barbanchon*

**RESEARCH  
EXPERIENCE**

**University of Pennsylvania**

Jun 2021 - Jun 2022

*Research Assistant to Juan Camilo Castillo*

**Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research**

Sep 2016 - Jun 2019

*Predocutorial Research Fellow*

**CREST - INSEE**

Feb 2016 - Jul 2016

*Research assistant to Pierre Cahuc*

**Banque de France**

Jun 2015 - Oct 2015

*Economist Intern*

**TEACHING  
EXPERIENCE**

Introduction to Microeconomics (TA to Anne Duchene, UPenn)

Fall, 2022

Ph.D. Industrial Organization (TA to Aviv Nevo, UPenn)

Fall, 2021

Introduction to Macroeconomics (TA to Luca Bossi, UPenn)

Spring, 2021

Intermediate Microeconomics (TA to Rakesh Vohra, UPenn)

Fall, 2020

Undergraduate Data Analysis in R (TA to Brad Larsen, Stanford University)

Fall, 2018

**HONORS &  
FELLOWSHIPS**

**Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center Research Fellowship**

2023

**Mack Institute Research Fellowship**

2021

**Ph.D. Fellowship, Graduate Division of Arts and Sciences**

2019-2020

**SIEPR Predocutorial Research Fellowship**

2016-2019

**REFeree**

Journal of Urban Economics

**PROGRAMMING**

Julia, Matlab, Python, R, Stata

**LANGUAGES**

Portuguese (native), Italian (native), French (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent)

**CITIZENSHIP**

Italy, Brazil

*Last updated: November 2024*